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 1 
The domestic politics of international climate commitments: which factors 
explain cross-country variation in NDC ambition? 
 
Vegard Tørstad12, Håkon Sælen3 and Live Standal Bøyum4 
Abstract 
Under the Paris Agreement, parties self-determine their mitigation ambition level by 
submitting Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Extant assessments find that the 
collective ambition of current pledges is not line with the Agreement’s goals and that 
individual ambition varies greatly across countries, but there have not been attempts at 
explaining this variation. This paper identifies several potential drivers of national climate 
ambition, and tests whether these can account for differences in the ambition level of 
countries’ mitigation targets under the Paris Agreement. After outlining theorized 
relationships between a set of domestic political characteristics and climate policy ambition, 
regression analysis is used to assess the effects of different potential drivers across a dataset 
of 170 countries. We find that a country’s level of democracy and vulnerability to climate 
change have positive effects on NDC ambition, while coal rent and GDP have negative 
effects. Our findings suggest that these objective factors are more important than subjective 
factors, while the most influential subjective factor is the cosmopolitanism-nativism value 
dimension. 
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Introduction 
In December 2015, 195 states adopted the Paris Agreement under the auspices of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC 2015). Under the new 
agreement, individual efforts are set through so-called Nationally Determined Contributions 
(NDCs) to be submitted every five years. 
 
The Paris Agreement aims to limit the increase in the global average temperature to “well 
below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase 
to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels” (UNFCCC 2015). To achieve these targets, dramatic 
strengthening of NDCs is needed already in 2020: countries must increase their NDC 
ambitions threefold to achieve the well below 2°C goal and more than fivefold to achieve the 
1.5°C goal (UNEP, 2019). Preliminary studies also highlight substantial variation in ambition 
levels across countries: while most are currently far from fulfilling what analysts have found 
to be “fair shares” of the necessary global mitigation effort, some are fulfilling or exceeding 
these expectations (Holz, Kartha and Athanasiou 2017; Robiou du Pont and Meinshausen 
2018).  
 
Yet, as the NDCs are of recent date, no study has so far empirically examined why ambition 
varies across a comprehensive set of NDCs.1 On this basis, Klinsky et al. (2016) call for work 
“to document and understand what drives adequate climate action and inaction.” 
Documenting the drivers of climate action is both theoretically and empirically challenging, 
as a given country’s climate policies result from a variety of interrelated factors. However, the 
bottom-up characteristics of the Paris Agreement, particularly its central feature of self-
determination of goals through NDCs, render the relationship between domestic politics and 
climate policy ambition worthy of exploration. In this paper we therefore analyze which 
domestic politics factors drive and impede climate policy ambition. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. First, we review the literature on domestic sources of 
international climate policy and divide this literature into objective and subjective factors. 
Thereafter, we propose six hypotheses about how these factors affect national climate policy 
ambition. The subsequent section outlines the methodology and data, before the results are 
presented and discussed. A concluding section summarizes the main findings and suggests 
avenues for future research.  
 
Literature review 
The domestic sources of international climate policy 
The Paris Agreement marks a new phase in international climate politics, to a logic of 
domestically driven action (Falkner 2016). Whereas under the Kyoto Protocol, national 
mitigation targets were defined in the agreement, the Paris Agreement itself contains no such 
targets but instead requires parties to put forward self-determined targets through the NDCs. 
 
 
1 Although see Cunliffe et al. (2019) for a comparison across four countries. 
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Given the new logic, it is paramount to investigate which domestic variables drive 
international climate ambition. In the current analysis, we review literature on country 
variation in climate policy and distinguish between objective and subjective drivers of 
ambition (Inglehart 1995). Objective factors comprise country characteristics and contextual 
conditions – for example, a country’s wealth level, fossil fuels resources, and vulnerability to 
climate change. Subjective factors are people’s individual viewpoints and comprise public 
opinion factors such as citizens’ political preferences, attitudes and values. We restrict our 
focus to factors for which the literature presents an expected relationship with climate policy 
ambition.2 
 
Objective factors and climate policy ambition 
Objective variables feature in a wide range of studies on climate policy ambition. For 
example, Sprinz and Vaahtoranta (1994) propose that the leaders and laggards in international 
climate policy can be crudely identified by comparing countries’ abatement costs and 
ecological vulnerability. Bang, Underdal and Andresen (2015) explore the domestic sources 
of climate policy in seven countries and find ambition to reflect, inter alia, a country’s energy 
resources and political institutions. Relatedly, Bailer (2012) suggests that interest groups, for 
example a strong petroleum lobby, and form of governance affect countries’ positions in the 
climate negotiations.  
 
In this paper, we hypothesize that three objective factors are linked to mitigation ambition. 
First, we expect that vulnerability to climate change has a positive effect on a country’s 
mitigation ambition level (H1) (Sprinz and Vaahtoranta 1994; Heggelund 2007). Vulnerable 
countries have an interest in ambitious global climate policies in order to minimise damages 
caused by climate change. Illustratively, vulnerable country groups such as the Alliance of 
Small Island States and the Least Developed Countries have historically been among the 
strongest proponents of increased climate ambition in the UNFCCC negotiations, and 
successfully pushed for incorporating the 1.5°C target in the Paris Agreement (Brun 2016). 
For vulnerable countries, high NDC ambition can help both with limiting the adverse effects 
of climate change and spur other countries to reciprocal contributions. 
 
Political institutions are important for climate ambition because they determine the range of 
interests that will be represented in climate policy decisions (Congleton 1992). Form of 
governance is presumably the most fundamental characteristic of any political system (Bättig 
and Bernauer 2009). The literature is divided on the relationship between democracy and 
environmental policies. One argument, based on collective action theory, is that political 
leaders in democracies generally have stronger incentives to provide public goods, such as 
environmental protection, than leaders in non-democracies do (Bättig and Bernauer 2009). 
The reasoning is that the benefits are dispersed to the population while costs are more 
concentrated on elites, and elites are more influential relative to the general population in non-
democracies than in democracies (Bättig and Bernauer 2009). On the other hand, democratic 
 
2 The literature on cross-country variations in climate policy differs from the literature on 
cross-country variations in greenhouse gas emissions (Bernauer 2013).  
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institutions have also been blamed for causing climate policy inertia by fostering short-sighted 
politicians that are susceptible to special interests (e.g. Jamieson 2014; Runciman 2018). 
Runciman (2018, p. 93), for example, asserts that ‘When it comes to climate change, 
democracy looks increasingly like the spell, not the cure.’ The theory of ‘authoritarian 
environmentalism’ (Gilley 2012) suggests that authoritarian regimes can produce more 
ambitious environmental policies because of their centralized powers, strong control over the 
environmental policy-making process and disregard for individual liberties. The increasingly 
proactive position of China on climate change is often cited as a case in point (Engels 2018).  
 
Yet, while the centralized powers of autocracies can allow swift action on climate change, 
such powers can also allow authoritarian rulers to shirk from enacting ambitious policies. If 
mitigating climate change is uniformly beneficial for the population of a country, the ruling 
elite in autocracies have little incentive to take on ambitious mitigation policies if the costs of 
such policies fall disproportionally on themselves (Congleton 1992; Bernauer et al. 2010). 
Large-N studies that have previously tested the relationship between democracy and 
environmental policy ambition find unequivocally that democracies are more ambitious. 
Neumayer (2002) measures commitment among 159 countries to four international 
environmental agreements from the 1990s and early 2000s and finds strong evidence that 
democracies are more environmentally committed than non-democracies. Further, Bättig and 
Bernauer (2009) track how 185 countries perform on four climate policy indicators over the 
period 1990-2004 and find that democracy has a positive effect on political commitment to 
climate change mitigation. We therefore hypothesize that democracies are more ambitious on 
mitigation than non-democracies (H2). 
 
Third, we expect that fossil fuels rent has a negative effect on a country’s mitigation ambition 
level (H3). There are at least three mechanisms through which fossil fuels rent may impede 
climate ambition. First, from an economic perspective, it can be costly for countries that are 
endowed with fossil fuels to mitigate climate change if the fossil fuels industry constitutes a 
significant source of government revenue, as mitigation policies are likely to affect such 
revenues negatively. Similarly, ambitious climate policies can have negative effects on the 
number of jobs in such industries and therefore be politically costly. Finally, in countries 
endowed with fossil fuels resources, governmental action on climate change is prone to 
lobbying from fossil fuels companies. For example, Levy and Egan (2003) show how a fossil 
fuels industry coalition successfully impeded the ambition level of US’ Kyoto Protocol 
commitments in the 1990s. In order to assess the effects of fossil fuels on mitigation ambition, 
we include data on countries’ coal, oil and gas rent in the quantitative analysis below. We 
expect that the three different types of fossil fuels have the same detrimental effect on 
mitigation ambition. 
 
Finally, we also include GDP per capita in the analysis, but the theoretical relationship with 
ambition is more complex. Richer countries generally have higher abatement costs, but also 
greater capability to shoulder these costs. Capability is recognized as a relevant variable for 
distributing efforts across countries both in the UNFCCC (UN, 1992) and in the Paris 
Agreement, and is incorporated in the ambition metric used in our analysis, as explained in 
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the methodological section. Additionally, GDP per capita correlates with current and 
historical emissions, which are also incorporated in this ambition metric. Hence, the metric 
itself captures that developed countries are expected to do more according to the Convention 
and the PA, so we have no hypothesis on how GDP per capita affects scores on the metric. 
However, we include it as a control variable to avoid picking up spurious effects of other 
explanatory variables that correlate with GDP. 
 
Subjective factors and climate policy ambition 
In addition to the objective variables above, the literature has found that the subjective views 
of citizens affect climate policy in a number of different countries. In this study, we focus on 
people’s subjective attitudes and values, and jointly refer to these as ‘public opinion’.  
 
Politicians tend to take the public’s preferences into account when formulating policies 
(Wlezien and Soroka 2012). This dynamic is demand-driven: the public articulates and 
diffuses political opinions, which politicians formulate policies in response to. Climate policy 
literature has evaluated the effect of various public opinion variables on the emergence of 
policies. Much of this research has focused on the United States (Anderson et al. 2017). 
Agnone (2007), for example, finds that pro-environmental attitudes has a positive effect on 
the enactment of federal environmental legislation in the United States over the period 1960-
1988, and that the effect is amplified by protests. Similarly, Purdy (2010) traces the origins 
and prominence of various environmental values in the US and demonstrates through case 
studies how these values have affected environmental legislation in the country. On a global 
scale, Weaver (2008) establishes a direct link between support for environmental policies and 
the ambition level of environmental policies in an analysis of 64 countries. Finally, Anderson 
et al. (2017) find that shifts in public attitudes toward pro-environmentalism lead to increases 
in renewable energy policies in Europe over the period 1974-2015.  
 
The studies cited above assess the link between public opinion and climate policy in 
democracies. In democracies, voters are generally free to articulate their policy preferences 
through designated channels of public opinion such as the media, demonstrations, interest 
groups and debates, and politicians are incentivized to translate voters’ preferences into policy 
in order to win elections. One model of the relationship between policy responsiveness and 
public opinion hence suggests that both office-holding and office-seeking politicians will try 
to appeal to the median voter’s policy preferences (Downs 1957; Anderson et al. 2017; 
Beiser-McGrath and Bernauer 2019). If so, we can expect that policymakers will strive to 
generate climate policy that is broadly in line with the general public opinion, as represented 
by the median voter, on climate change.  
 
In non-democracies, the relationship between public opinion and climate policy is 
theoretically more ambiguous, as accountability mechanisms between the rulers and the ruled 
are weaker. Nevertheless, political leadership in authoritarian regimes also depend on support 
from their citizens. In China, for example, local environmental issues, such as air pollution, 
have led to public demands for more ambitious climate- and environmental policies (Wiener 
2008; Tang et. al 2018). Notably, Tang et. al (2018) find that public dissatisfaction with the 
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state of the environment has led to an increase in policies implemented to address atmospheric 
pollution by Chinese provincial governments in the period 2011-2015. 
  
In summary, there is reason to expect that public opinion can affect national climate policy 
ambition, both in democracies and non-democracies. Two ways of operationalizing public 
opinion emerge from the literature as particularly relevant for the current analysis: the first is 
a direct measure of the public’s attitudes toward climate change policy; the second is a 
measure of a given population’s values.   
 
Recently, environmental politics literature has shown considerable interest in measuring the 
public’s attitudes toward climate change across countries (e.g., Brulle, Carmichael and 
Jenkins 2012; Kvaløy, Finseraas and Listhaug 2012; Scruggs and Benegal 2012). In the 
current analyses, we use data on specific attitudes to the Paris Agreement across 40 
countries (Pew Research Center 2015). In the spring of 2015, survey respondents were 
asked whether they supported their own country taking on mitigation policies under the Paris 
Agreement, which was to be negotiated later that year. We simply expect that countries with 
populations that supported their own country taking on mitigation policies under the Paris 
Agreement, will have more ambitious NDCs (H4). 
 
The second strand of literature on the relationship between public opinion and climate change 
addresses how the public’s values can affect climate policy. A value can be understood as a 
fundamental and lasting human attribute, from the basis of which norms, attitudes, opinions 
and behavior can emanate (Rokeach 1968). The relationship between values and climate 
policy is more complex than the relationship between attitudes and policy, as a number of 
different values or value sets are potentially relevant (Feinberg and Willer 2012; Kvaløy, 
Finseraas and Listhaug 2012; Cherry, Kallbekken and Kroll 2017; Cherry, McEvoy and 
Sælen 2017). In this analysis, we include two main value sets as explanatory variables: a 
materialist-postmaterialist dimension and a nativism-cosmopolitanism dimension.  
 
First, the materialist-postmaterialist dimension is included because Ronald Inglehart’s 
postmaterialism thesis is the principal theory for explaining pro-environmental attitudes in the 
literature on green values (Dunlap and York 2008; Kvaløy, Finseraas and Listhaug 2012; 
Franzen and Vogl 2013). Inglehart (1995) contends that people with postmaterialist values—
such as self-expression and the quality of life—are more inclined to support protection of the 
environment than people with materialist values, i.e., people emphasizing economic and 
physical security. In the literature, postmaterialist values have been shown to spur the 
emergence of environmental movements, green parties, environmental concern, and green 
activism (Abramson and Inglehart 1995; Grob 1995; Booth 2017). Inglehart’s value theory 
leads us to hypothesize that postmaterialist values among citizens have a positive effect on 
countries’ mitigation ambition level (H5).  
 
Second, studies have found a strong relationship between right-wing populist views and 
hostility to climate policies (Gemenis et al., 2012; Lockwood 2018). A defining feature of 
right-wing populism is nativism (Mudde 2007), which favours national self-interest over 
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 7 
international cooperation, and is the opposite of cosmopolitanism (Inglehart and Norris, 
2016). We hypothesize that cosmopolitan values have a positive effect on countries’ 
mitigation ambition under the Paris Agreement (H6). 
 
Hypothesis Factor type 
H1: Vulnerability to climate change has a positive effect on a country’s 
mitigation ambition level 
Objective 
H2: Democracy has a positive effect on a country’s mitigation ambition 
level 
Objective 
H3: Fossil fuels rent has a negative effect on a country’s mitigation 
ambition level 
Objective 
H4: Public support for taking on mitigation policies under the Paris 
Agreement has a positive effect on a country’s mitigation ambition level 
Subjective 
H5: Postmaterial values of citizens have a positive effect on a country’s 
mitigation ambition level  
Subjective 
H6: Cosmopolitan values of citizens have a positive effect on a country’s 
mitigation ambition level  
Subjective 
Table 1. Hypotheses.  
Methodology  
To assess whether the objective and subjective climate policy factors are related to the 
ambition level of NDCs, we conduct a statistical analysis on a sample of 170 countries3 that 
have submitted NDCs. To measure these countries’ climate ambition, we use data from 
Robiou du Pont and Meinshausen (2018), who apply a hybrid allocation approach to estimate 
the global temperature impact consistent with each given country’s NDC, assuming that 
efforts were distributed based on the effort-sharing principle most lenient for the given 
country. The principles included are capability to pay (GDP per capita), historical 
responsibility (convergence to equal cumulative per capita emissions), and equality 
(convergence to equal per capita emissions). The data includes high, low and average scores 
for each country; we will mainly use the average scores. These scores range from 1.2°C 
warming (most ambitious) to over 5.1°C (least ambitious). We invert the scale to facilitate 
interpretation, so that higher scores mean higher ambition, with a range from 0 to 3.9. Scores 
are displayed in Figure 1, which shows that the bulk of the most ambitious countries are 
African. Additionally, a few Asian and South American countries—such as Pakistan and 
Peru—have NDC targets that are rated as 1.2°C consistent. Switzerland is rated the most 
ambitious developed country, being 1.6°C consistent. The NDCs of major emitters such as 
China, Russia, Saudi Arabia and South Africa are rated as the least ambitious—i.e. consistent 
with more than 5.1°C warming.  
 
3 Our analysis includes 170 countries because this is the number of countries that are included 
in the dataset provided by Robiou du Pont and Meinshausen (2018). Countries for which 
NDC ambition data are unavailable are colored gray in figure 1. The 170 countries are listed 
in supplementary text 4. Note that the EU submitted one NDC with EU-wide targets, and 
Robiou du Pont and Meinshausen (2018)’s data on NDC ambition are based on that NDC. 
This means that the NDC ambition variable does not take into account differentiated targets 
that have since been negotiated within the EU.  
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We use this assessment as our dependent variable because it has global coverage, minimizes 
the normative choices made, and avoids making counterfactual assumptions about business-
as-usual emissions. However, there is no agreement between countries on what constitutes a 
fair differentiation of efforts, and some scholars disagree with some of the normative choices 
necessary to Robiou du Pont and Meinshausen’s (2018) analysis. Their selection of principles 
is based on a categorization from the IPCC, but this is not universally accepted as an 
authoritative and ethically robust taxonomy (Kartha et al. 2018). Normative choices are also 
needed to operationalize the principles. For example, historical emissions are counted from 
1990; an earlier start date would redistribute effort from developing to developed countries. 
Furthermore, the two other principles include a transition period until 2040, meaning that a 
large share of remaining emissions are allocated proportionally to current emissions (Kartha 
et al. 2018). Due to this lack of consensus, we perform sensitivity analyses using alternative 
NDC assessments from Germanwatch (Burck et al. 2019) and Climate Action Tracker (2019). 
Our main results are robust to these alternative specifications. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Illustration of NDC Ambition scores for 170 countries. Based on Robiou du Pont 
and Meinshausen (2018).  
 
The independent variables in our analysis are the four objective factors and three subjective 
factors identified in the literature review above. We collect data for these variables from a 
range of different data sources. Data is more widely available for the objective than the 
subjective factors, limiting the statistical power of the analyses of the latter. Nevertheless, our 
data on subjective factors cover a representative sample of countries from all regions of the 
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world, listed in Supplementary text 4. Table S1 in supplementary text 1 lists key information 
about all variables used for the quantitative analysis. Ordinary least square (OLS) regression 
models are used to fit the data. Supplementary text 3 contains additional regression models 
that include different configurations of independent variables than the models discussed here; 
additional independent variables; and additional dependent variables that take into account the 
conditionality of NDCs. All results presented below are robust to these alternative model 
specifications. The data used for the analysis and instructions to reproduce the results are 
available online (Tørstad, Sælen and Bøyum 2019).  
 
Empirical analysis  
Regression results 
To test the six hypotheses outlined in the literature review, we fit four regression models with 
NDC ambition as the dependent variable and the objective and subjective factors as 
independent variables. The results are presented in table 2 below. Model 1 includes the 
objective factors; model 2 includes the objective factors and citizens’ support for taking on 
mitigation policies under the Paris Agreement; model 3 contains only the values, while model 
4 adds the objective factors as controls. Selected bivariate relationships are plotted in 
Supplementary text 2. 
 
 Dependent variable: 
 NDC ambition 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 7.102*** (2.431) 12.388 (8.775) -3.109 (2.186) 3.342 (4.499) 
GDP/Capita (log) -0.803*** (0.178) -0.991* (0.545)  -0.873*** (0.313) 
Democracy index 1.574*** (0.417) 2.856*** (0.817)  1.128 (0.730) 
Coal rent -0.963** (0.370) -1.988*** (0.719)  -1.252* (0.677) 
Natural gas rent -0.068 (0.054) -0.126 (0.557)  -0.218* (0.126) 
Oil rent 0.022 (0.021) 0.129 (0.259)  0.020 (0.034) 
Vulnerability index 4.169* (2.111) 4.912 (6.148)  5.552 (4.245) 
Paris Agreement 
support 
 -1.626 (1.282)   
Postmaterialism   -0.267 (0.521) 0.692 (0.580) 
Cosmopolitanism   1.815*** (0.596) 0.575 (0.588) 
Observations 149 38 53 51 
R2 0.532 0.682 0.158 0.517 
Adjusted R2 0.512 0.608 0.124 0.425 
F Statistic 
26.887*** (df = 6; 
142) 
9.193*** (df = 7; 
30) 
4.681** (df = 2; 
50) 
5.616*** (df = 8; 
42) 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 2. Ordinary least squares regressions explaining NDC ambition as a function of 
objective and subjective domestic factors.  
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Objective factors and ambition 
First, GDP per capita has a strong negative association with ambition. The bivariate 
correlation is strongly negative (Pearson’s r =-0.65, p<0.01, see Supplementary Figure S2), 
and the effect is also significant in a regression controlling for other objective factors, as 
shown in Table 2. Thus, poorer countries are more ambitious than richer ones, also when 
holding other factors constant. The model predicts that a 1% increase in GDP/Capita 
corresponds to a .38% reduction in NDC ambition (evaluated at the variables’ means across 
these 149 countries). The negative effect of GDP per capita also holds across two alternative 
NDC ambition metrics (see table 3 below). However, as noted earlier, we do not posit that 
there is a causal effect of GDP, because richer countries are held to higher standards than 
poorer countries in the three assessments we rely on.  
 
Second, the bivariate relationship between Vulnerability and NDC ambition is strongly 
positive (Pearson’s r= 0.63, p=0), as hypothesized. In the regression model above (table 2), 
Vulnerability has positive effect on ambition significant at 10% level. The effect is relatively 
large: a 1% increase on the Vulnerability index corresponds to .87% increase in NDC 
ambition.  
   
The two other statistically significant effects in model 1 are from Democracy and Coal rent. 
The hypothesis that democratic countries have more ambitious climate policies than non-
democracies finds support in the regression model. The model shows that democracy has 
indeed a positive and statistically significant effect on NDC ambition. However, the effect is 
smaller than for Vulnerability: a 1% increase in the Democracy index corresponds to .29% 
increase in ambition. Further, the effect of Democracy is conditional on controlling for the 
effects of the other objective variables, as the bivariate correlation with ambition is weak and 
insignificant (Pearson’s r=-0.12, p=0.13; see figure S2 in Supplementary text 2).  
 
Fourth, we hypothesized that fossil fuels rent would have a negative effect on NDC ambition. 
Our regression model finds that there is a relationship between fossil fuels endowments and 
ambition, but that the type of fossil fuels matters: while the effects of oil and gas are 
negligible, coal rent has a negative effect on ambition in our sample. The raw coefficient 
implies that an increase in coal rent of 1% of GDP corresponds to decreased ambition by 
roughly 1°C. However, mean coal rent is only .07% of GDP, translating into a low elasticity 
of -0.03. 
 
Public attitudes and ambition 
We now proceed to the effects of subjective factors on NDC ambition and discuss hypotheses 
5-8. First, we expected that public support for taking on mitigation policies under the Paris 
Agreement would lead to higher NDC ambition. However, our data indicate little support for 
such a relationship. Figure S3 in supplementary text 2 displays the bivariate relationship 
between average public support for the Paris Agreement and countries’ NDC ambition level. 
The two variables are not significantly correlated (Pearson’s r= 0.16, p=0.32). It should be 
noted, however, that statistical power is limited by the lower number of countries for which 
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data on attitudes is available (39 in the bivariate analysis and 38 in the regressions).4 
Additionally, there is very low variation in this explanatory variable, which limits its ability to 
explain variation in the outcome variable, reflecting the publics in all these countries strongly 
supported their own country taking on mitigation policies under the Agreement.  
 
The relationship between public support for mitigation policies under the Paris Agreement 
and a country’s NDC ambition level is not strengthened by controlling for the effects of other 
variables. Regression model 2 includes the Paris Agreement support variable along with the 
objective factors from the previous model. The model does not corroborate H5, which 
proposed that public support for taking on mitigation policies under the Paris Agreement 
would lead to higher NDC ambition. On the contrary, the model suggests that the effect of 
Paris Agreement support on NDC ambition is negligible when controlled for the objective 
factors. As in model 1, GDP, Democracy and Coal rent are statistically significant factors.  
 
Public values and climate ambition 
We now turn to the second part of the analysis of subjective factors, which asks whether 
citizens’ values affect the ambition level of climate policy. We test two hypotheses: that 
postmaterialist (H5) and cosmopolitan (H6) values among citizens should lead to more 
ambitious climate policy for a given country.  
 
Simple correlation analysis indicates that cosmopolitanism is more closely related to NDC 
ambition than postmaterialism. While postmaterialism and NDC ambition are unconnected 
(Pearson’s r= 0.02, p=0.9) in our sample, cosmopolitanism and NDC ambition are moderately 
positively correlated (Pearson’s r=0.38, p=0.005). Also here, the number of observations (53) 
limits statistical power.5 
 
The same relationships still hold when regressing NDC ambition on the two values without 
including other control variables (model 3).6 However, when the objective factors are 
included as controls (model 4), the significance of cosmopolitanism vanishes. Instead, GDP 
and fossil fuels rent are again the strongest predictors, with detrimental effects on ambition. 
 
Sensitivity to NDC ambition metric 
We test whether the findings on objective factors hold for two different operationalizations of 
NDC ambition. Model 1 below uses Burck et al.’s (2018) Climate Change Performance Index 
(CCPI) as dependent variable. Model 2 below uses Climate Action Tracker (CAT)’s (2019) 
rating of 28 countries’ NDCs as dependent variable. Compared with the main results, all 
coefficients have the same signs, except for Vulnerability based on CCPI, but this may be due 
to a lack of highly vulnerable countries in the CCPI dataset. With much lower number of 
 
4 These countries are listed in Supplementary text 4.  
5 These countries are listed in Supplementary text 4. 
6 In Supplementary text 2, we also show that the relationship between Cosmopolitanism and 
NDC ambition is robust to a different operationalization of the Cosmopolitanism-Nativism 
scale.  
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observations, especially in CAT, fewer effects are significant; but the negative effect of 
GDP/Capita is significant across the two models. Based on CAT, oil rents have a negative 
effect significant at the 10% level. Note that unlike Robiou du Pont and Meinshausen (2018), 
these two alternatives include implementation of NDCs when assessing ambition. 
 
 Dependent variable: 
 CCPI 2019 CAT 2019  
 (1) (2) 
Constant 230.778*** (64.415) 10.199* (5.328) 
GDP/Capita (log) -16.360*** (5.186) -0.795** (0.376) 
Democracy index 18.786** (7.979) 0.934 (0.783) 
Coal rents -14.785** (7.195) -0.852 (0.642) 
Natural gas rents 0.831 (2.739) -0.225 (0.319) 
Oil rents -1.113* (0.606) -0.001 (0.055) 
Vulnerability index -60.645 (52.912) 0.184 (5.096) 
Observations 53 28 
R2 0.438 0.464 
Adjusted R2 0.365 0.311 
F Statistic 5.973*** (df = 6; 46) 3.033** (df = 6; 21) 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 3. Objective factors and two alternative NDC ambition metrics. 
 
Sensitivity to conditionality in NDCs 
Our analysis finds that low GDP/capita and high vulnerability are associated with high 
ambition. However, the fractions of NDCs where the mitigation component is conditional on 
financial support from developing countries is larger among low-income countries and small-
island developing states (including some with relatively high income) than among other 
countries. It could therefore be that these countries appear more ambitious than others because 
they have included conditional contributions. Adjusting for conditionality could in principle 
also affect other results obtained. We therefore perform three tests on whether the results are 
sensitive to such conditions, reported in supplementary tables 7-9 and accompanying 
discussion. In summary, our results appear robust to how we handle conditionality of NDCs.   
 
Discussion and conclusions 
Responding to a call from the literature about the need for delineating the empirical drivers of 
climate ambition, this paper has theoretically outlined, and empirically tested, the relationship 
between various domestic politics variables and countries’ pledged NDC ambition under the 
Paris Agreement. 
 
By regressing the ambition level of 170 countries’ NDCs on nine potential explanatory 
factors, we find four objective factors to be robust predictors of climate policy ambition. 
Democracy and Vulnerability to climate change have positive effects on NDC ambition, 
while Coal rent has a negative effect. These findings, which are consistent with self-interested 
state behavior, affirm three of our hypotheses about the drivers of climate policy. Further, 
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GDP has a negative coefficient across all models, illustrating that poorer countries have on 
average pledged more ambitious climate policies than wealthier ones, according to the 
assessment on which this analysis is based (Robiou du Pont and Meinshausen 2018).  
 
Hypothesis Result Finding 
H1: Vulnerability to climate change has a 
positive effect on a country’s mitigation 
ambition level 
Supported Vulnerability has a positive 
effect on NDC ambition  
H2: Democracy has a positive effect on a 
country’s mitigation ambition level 
Supported Democracy has a positive 
effect on NDC ambition  
H3: Fossil fuels rent has a negative effect on a 
country’s mitigation ambition level 
Partially supported Only coal rent, not oil and 
gas, has a negative effect on 
NDC ambition 
H4: Public support for taking on mitigation 
policies under the Paris Agreement has a 
positive effect on a country’s mitigation 
ambition level 
Not supported We find no evidence of a 
relationship between the two 
variables 
H5: Postmaterial values of citizens have a 
positive effect on a country’s mitigation 
ambition level  
Not supported We find no evidence of a 
relationship between the two 
variables 
H6: Cosmopolitan values of citizens have a 
positive effect on a country’s mitigation 
ambition level 
Mixed evidence Moderately strong bivariate 
relationship, but no 
statistically significant effect 
when control variables are 
included 
Table 5. Summary of findings.  
 
The effects of Democracy and Coal rent offer policy implications. Democratic institutions 
have been blamed for causing climate policy inertia by fostering short-sighted politicians that 
are susceptible to special interests (e.g. Jamieson 2014; Runciman 2018). However, our 
results highlight the importance of distinguishing the effects of form of governance from the 
influence of special interests: Democracy is associated with higher climate ambition, while 
Coal rents have a robust negative effect across the models. These findings suggest that 
ensuring strong accountability between political leaders and citizens and reducing coal 
dependence are two political strategies that likely will affect NDC ambition positively. 
Notably, measures to reduce coal dependence could have a double and self-reinforcing effect 
on emissions. In addition to reducing emissions directly, they make it politically easier to 
raise policy ambition. In this light, the recent coinciding trends of increased autocratization 
(Lührmann et al 2018) and rebound in coal production in large countries such as China, India, 
Indonesia and Russia (Enerdata 2018) reduce the likelihood of countries increasing ambition 
when updating or revising NDCs in 2020.  
 
Of subjective factors, we find no evidence of a relationship between citizens’ support for 
taking on mitigation policies under the Paris Agreement and countries’ NDC ambition, nor 
between postmaterial values and ambition. However, a moderately strong bivariate 
relationship between cosmopolitanism and NDC ambition suggests that the effects of this 
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value are worth investigating further in future research. This variable is of great political 
interest, because it measures a defining feature of right-wing populism, which extant research 
has shown to indicate increasing political polarization on climate politics (Fraune and Knodt 
2018). It would be interesting to explore and explain the relationship between 
cosmopolitanism and support for climate policies, using individual-level data. To the extent 
there is a negative relationship between right-wing populism and NDC ambition, it further 
decreases the likelihood of increased NDC ambition in 2020, as there has been a rise of right-
wing populist parties and politicians globally (Rooduijn 2019), particularly after current 
NDCs were formulated. This trend calls for research on the effects on climate policy when 
right-wing populist parties gain political power.  
 
The weak effects of subjective factors on climate policy ambition is not sufficient evidence 
for rejecting that these factors matter. The primary caveat to this analysis is the lack of data on 
relevant subjective factors covering a large number of countries. In the analysis of subjective 
factors, the sample size is reduced by some 100 countries compared with the analysis of 
objective factors only, resulting in reduced statistical power. Additionally, in the case of the 
Paris Agreement support variable, most populations expressed strong support for taking on 
mitigation policies under the Agreement. The low cross-country variation on the variable 
precluded strong effects in the regressions. However, the lack of variation on this variable 
may be good news for the compliance prospects of the Paris Agreement, as the high scores 
across the sample indicate that most countries have a strong mandate in domestic electorates 
for implementing mitigation policies under the Agreement. Hence, even though the objective 
factors come out as more important than the subjective factors in the current analysis, the 
effect of subjective factors should be further tested on a larger sample of countries when more 
data become available. Future research should therefore survey climate change attitudes and 
related values in more countries. Further, comparative case studies that explore the relative 
effects of subjective and objective factors on climate ambition in countries that have extreme 
values on the ambition variable could be useful.  
 
Finally, this paper has analyzed climate policy commitments, but not the degree to which 
these are actually put into effect. While our findings largely hold for two alternative NDC 
ambition metrics that incorporate both ambition and implementation, future research should 
further explore whether the effects identified here also apply for the implementation stage of 
NDCs when more such data become available.  
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